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The philosophical origins of contemporary American conservatism derive 
from multiple strands of political and economic thought.  A rhetorically 
prominent aspect of the contemporary movement, its narrative about free markets 
and opposition to state intervention in the economy, had been adopted from the 
early laissez-faire individualism of the American Old Right.  In the American 
context, this political economic orientation has typically been referred to as 
libertarianism.  The terms, Old Right, laissez-faire individualism, classical 
liberalism, and libertarianism are more or less used in this paper interchangeably.  
While these terms have a distinct meaning in the American political philosophic 
lexicon, which differs from how they are used elsewhere, their use here will be 
consistent with American terminological conventions.   
This article explores the ideology and political activity of some important 
thinkers and organizations associated with this strand of conservatism during the 
post-war period.  Of special interest is how the synthesis of libertarianism with 
traditionalist (classical) conservatism has been expressed through contemporary 
economic and social policy discourse.  Offered here is an analysis of the 
constituent ideas, some of the mechanisms through which laissez-faire capitalist 
ideology was deployed, and the conditions which determined how they were 
incorporated into a larger and more politically viable (though contradictory) 
narrative.  The emphasis on influencing idea makers through scholarship and on 
using a growing network of media outlets to generate consensus through 
ideological habituation is now common practice by elite policy planning 
networks. However it was initiated by libertarian thinkers just after the World 
War II.  Also, the conservative appropriation of the rhetoric of revolution, liberty, 
and anti-statism and the connection of the concept of freedom to self-interest and 
economic/ consumer choice was developed through the philosophy and work of 
the libertarians. 
The present author hopes to develop a historical understanding of the 
American conservative movement and some of its precedent forces and ideas.  
This is critical given its success in shaping both policy and the political culture.  
Tracing the development of American libertarianism is vital for understanding its 
history and philosophy as distinct from traditionalist conservatism and from 
today’s conservative movement.  This article focuses on the movement’s 
contributions to contemporary social policy discourse and its related ideologies – 
i.e. anti-statism, the moral work ethic, the fetish of personal responsibility/ self-
sufficiency, market fundamentalism, etc.  Libertarianism was influential and vital 
for the success of American conservatism overall.  However, the political and 
ideological merging of laissez-fairism and classical conservatism was not a 
smooth one.  In fact these two formations, philosophically, are incompatible.  
Even so, the tenets of the American laissez-fairists, already amounting to what 
Karl Polanyi described as the stark utopia of the self-adjusted market, were 
appropriated by the New Right into a slipshod, contradictory ideology, the 
imperatives of which were (and continue to be) the use of the enlightenment 
narrative of individual liberty as a rhetorical device and the justification of the 






The old, laissez-faire right would come to be known in the United States 
as libertarianism, and eventually became integrated into New Right or fusionist 
conservatism.  It eschewed political and philosophical positions which supported 
the need for centralized power and a large state during the interwar period, 
including military involvement in matters of foreign affairs.  Individual liberty 
was sacrosanct, and inequality in society was regarded as a necessary outcome of 
conditions where employers and workers contracted with each other freely and 
compensation was dependent on talent and merit.  American traditionalist 
conservatism, in contrast, was often hostile toward the notion of mass democracy.  
Hierarchy in society was not necessarily regarded as the result of an economy 
whose functions are best left unhindered, but rather the vestige of a better time 
and glorious, quasi-feudal past.  Religious and moral considerations were the 
guiding principles for this wing of conservatism.  Fusionist conservatism, 
incorporated principles from both of these movements, and would eventually 
constitute what would become the New Right.  Not to be confused with this 
political and intellectual movement, the origins of what came to be called 
neoconservatism was altogether different.  The term, neoconservative, was first 
applied to a particular group of ex-progressive intellectuals who moved to the 
right and would eventually reject international communism, the radical student 
movements, and the emerging New Left in the 1950s and 1960s.  While 
neoconservatism in some ways has remained distinct from the contemporary 
American right, its style and modus operandi would be absorbed into the larger 
conservative movement by the 1970s and helped make it more engaging and 
compelling to the general public, in part (and like the fusionists a couple decades 
before) by further relegating laissez-faire individualism to an instrumentalist 
ideology.  American conservatism is a complex and contradictory philosophical 
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and political mongrel.  The significance of its politico-philosophical synthesis, as 
it relates to social and economic policy, is perhaps best understood in terms of its 
consequences.  Laissez-faire economics had become largely relegated to a 
semantic instrument employed in the service of preserving the social order and 
class structure.  This process was initiated by the New Right and it appropriated 
the anti-New Dealism and anti-statism of the American Old Right. 
George H. Nash saw the landscape of contending conservatisms as 
“divergent tendencies” consisting of  
three loosely related groups:  traditionalists or new 
conservatives, appalled by the erosion of values and the 
emergence of a secular, rootless, mass society; libertarians, 
apprehensive about the threat of the State to private 
enterprise and individualism; and disillusioned ex-radicals 
and their allies, alarmed by international Communism.
 2
 
In the early post-war period, American conservatism consisted of diverging 
tendencies, and the different groups were only loosely related.  Ex-radicals and 
former progressives were brought into the conservative fold along varying stages 
of the movement's transformation and helped determine its direction.  By the early 
1950s, the various strands of conservative thought were not mutually exclusive: 
Traditionalists and libertarians were usually anti-
Communist, while ex-Communists generally endorsed free-
market capitalism and Western traditions.  Nevertheless, 
the impulses that comprised the developing conservative 
movement were clearly diverse.
3
 
The potential political benefits of consolidating conservatives and generating a 
sort of ideological consensus became apparent, and the iconic conservative, 
William F. Buckley Jr. played a pivotal role in this process with the formation of 
the New Right journal of opinion, National Review (NR).  Buckley’s NR would 
greatly support the uniting, though not always amiably, of the diverging 
tendencies on the right.  “Collectivism” represented to the libertarians the drive 
towards central planning and increased government control, which created 
conditions conducive for the gradual decline of individual liberty and ultimately 
toward totalitarianism.  Conversely, to the traditionalist conservatives, it 
represented a concerted and combined effort through an ideology of modernist 
rationalism and relativism (which would also in due course result in 
totalitarianism) to do away with an older, wiser, and hierarchical social order.  For 
the stalwart conservatives in each camp, Nazism, Stalinism, and New Dealism 
were all regarded as different forms of the same species of collectivist political 
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formation.  Accordingly, government efforts toward redistribution were 
vehemently opposed.  
  
 
THE VIRTUE OF ANARCHIC MARKETS 
 
The years leading up to the enactment of the New Deal and especially the 
involvement of the US in World War II were not exactly fertile times for staunch 
libertarians.  The authority of Keynesianism was widely accepted, and according 
to a Roper poll for Fortune Magazine, over two-thirds of the population supported 
government intervention in the economy and supported government programs to 
ensure subsistence for those with no other means.
 4
  Murray Rothbard noted that 
the Old Right comprised the American right from the mid 1930s to approximately 
the mid 1950s.
 5
  A common theme in the early thought and literature of the 
laissez-fairists during this period was the crisis of an emerging totalitarianism in 
democratic societies.  This emergence was explained in large part by growing 
bureaucracies and increased restrictions on individual freedom, both largely due 
to the increasingly centralized power of (often well meaning) government 
planners.  Through the 1930s, its rhetoric was radically anti-establishment but at 
times unabashedly elitist, eliciting the label “Tory anarchism” by later adherents 
and analysts.  Philosophical absolutes were a prominent point of emphasis.  For 
example, the notion of the self-regulating market was attributed to natural laws, 
and advocates of central planning were indicted as relativists who oppose nature 
itself and deny moral standards.  This absolutism was pervasive across all strands 
of conservatism.  Eventually, post-war libertarian material would become 
noticeably less radical.  Many libertarians came to adopt traditionalist elements to 
their philosophies and came to collaborate politically and ideologically with 
traditionalist conservatives, despite philosophical incompatibility.  Libertarianism 
placed much importance on the role of ideas in the shaping of history, and thus a 
battle of ideas was identified as the most appropriate response to the threat of 
collectivism and collectivist ideology.  However, the libertarian Old Right was 
originally a critical reaction to an even older right, the conservatism of early 
nineteenth century Europe.  Its philosophical premise was certainly in opposition 
to the power of throne and altar but was also and more generally anti-statist, anti-
monopoly, and anti-big government.  It was an expression of irreverence to the 
idea of absolute power exercised through traditional authority.  In the 1930s, it 
regarded New Deal legislation as an expression of the state imposing tyrannical 
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programs of redistribution on the public.  Similarly, the entrance of the US into 
the Second World War and the onset of the cold war were understood by many 
libertarians as unnecessary and immoral expansions of government.  To the 
laissez-faire individualists, the world had surely deviated from its proper 
economic and policy trajectory, but they were hardly idle during these years.  
While things were grim for the laissez-faire Old Right, it had postured itself as a 
feisty underdog in a battle against a modern liberal, corporate, leviathan state 
which was collecting and consolidating power.  However, as the urgency of the 
global communist threat became a growing concern among conservatives, the role 
of free-market ideas shifted significantly as libertarians and their ideas were being 
folded into the larger conservative intellectual and political movements. 
Rothbard and Nash present the Old Right as an embattled group whose 
ranks initially stuck to its convictions but then either faded away, ultimately 
joined the New Right in its anti-communist crusade, or held on to its individualist 
and isolationist position in relative obscurity come World War II and beyond.
6, 7, 8
  
American political and economic commitments had curiously shifted and 
realigned from the inter-war period to the outbreak of World War II.  The early 
laissez-fairists, like Albert Jay Nock and H.L Mencken, didn’t regard themselves 
as conservatives in the 1920s but later joined anti-New Deal conservatives like 
Herbert Hoover in opposition to the Social Security Act.
9, 10
  Though always anti-
egalitarian, laissez-faire individualists like Mencken and Nock had allied 
themselves with progressives and socialists against the League of Nations, big 
business, and repressive government control of personal moral behavior.  
Mencken had founded the American Mercury in 1924 with George Jean Nathan, 
and he explained that the paper’s editors would not make any claims of any one 
“sovereign balm” which would cure the world of its problems.
11
  While it served 
as a forum for a variety of oppositional views, including those against war and 
imperialism, it was a sort of bastion of ideas supporting a market system free from 
interference from the state.  In the first issue, he noted that the common belief in 
easy class mobility in the American system was simply untruth.  While he saw 
this ideology for what it was, “the American national religion,” he also expressed 
that the notion that “the interests of landlord and tenet, hangman and condemned, 
cat and rat are identical” is some of the “worst nonsense prevailing”.
12
  The 
market was portrayed less as a mechanism that would fulfill all of societies needs, 
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but rather one which would preserve natural inequalities and distribute resources 
based on natural faculties.  Zoologist and social Darwinist H.M. Parshley wrote in 
an early issue that the “teaching of modern biology is …diametrically opposed to 
the abolition of free competition, as implied, for instance, in giving undue 
assistance to the weak at the expense of the strong or in maintaining uniform 
wages for variable workmen.”
13
  Another article described the division of labor in 
capitalism, its hierarchical structure, and system of unequal rewards as a system 
that works.  It explained that “while it may not be fit for Paradise, it is certainly 




Nock co-founded and edited The Freeman, along with Francis Neilson, 
from 1920-1924.  Nock considered himself an individualist and radical, writing in 
the tradition of Herbert Spencer.  While The Freeman also provided a venue for a 
variety of writers who were oppositionists and considered leftists, Nock described 
himself and the magazine as friends of the capitalist.
15
  Many of the weekly’s 
contributors hailed the benefits of a system where the capitalist and worker were 
co-partners, not adversaries, in the realm of production.
16
  However, Nock was 
opposed to big business and warned that not all capitalists should be regarded as 
monopolists, for it is “the monopolist who is the real enemy of both capital and 
labor.”
17
  Nock argued that competition, not the struggles of labor unions, should 
determine wages as per the laws of the market and that the duty of the radical is to 
recognize that monopoly, not a need for arbitrary redistribution, is the true root of 
social problems.
18
  At this period of his writing, he identified conservatism (in the 
form of traditional authority) as deeply problematic, seeing among the leadership 
of Soviet Russia the same conservative features as those in the American state 
which assisted monopolists in amassing their great fortunes.  In his first column of 
the American Mercury after Mencken had resigned editorship, Nock had 
identified the New Deal as a continuation of prohibition and government aid to 
big business.
19
  In addition, he argued that the issue of relief is one for which no 
society is solvent enough to work out.  He reflects in his Journal of Forgotten 
Days that “no country was ever yet rich enough to feed all its idle people, nor is 
ours”.
20
  In this work, he laments that the only political debate on the New Deal at 
that time was not about its legitimacy, but rather quibbling over who will be 
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fortunate enough to operate the levers of power in administering it.
21
  What 
became a perfunctory and omnipresent aspect of American social life, Nock saw 
the New Deal as an extension of the tyranny of state power, and along with 
fascism, Nazism, and Stalinism, it was part of the same tendency of centralized 
power to act as an impediment to individual liberty.
22
  In his memoirs, Nock 
wondered how many “plain people” in the US “would know that Communism, 
the New Deal, Fascism, Nazism are merely so many trade names for collectivist 
Statism, like the trade names for tooth-pastes which are all exactly alike except 
for the flavouring [sic].”
23
 
 The landscape of tendencies which would eventually come to be called the 
conservative movement was divided, embittered, and had undergone a series of 
chaotic realignments and consolidations leading up to the Second World War.  
Realignments and regroupings among the free-marketers had come out of a range 
of strategic considerations, acts of desperation, and feelings of despondency and 
betrayal.  Against the New Deal, many laissez-faire individualists felt that there 
was no choice but to join “the conservatives, monopolists, Hooverites, etc., whom 
they had previously despised.”
24, 25
  Consider Nock’s comments on Hoover’s anti-
New Deal book, The Challenge to Liberty:  “Think of a book on such a subject, by 
such a man!  It makes one wonder how many people in this country would read a 
treatise on liberty, written by a disinterested hand.”
26
  The joining of former allies 
and collaborators on the left to the New Deal coalition, like the American 
Communist Party during the Popular Front period, left many laissez-faire 
individualists feeling astonished and resentful.  Since many libertarians were 
critics of US intervention in the war, charges were made by former collaborators 
who became supporters of the war effort that the isolationism of the laissez-fairists 
was reactionary and akin to fascism.  Thus, many early libertarians found 
themselves forming a coalition with strange bedfellows, particularly conservative 
Republicans, who in their view were partly responsible for creating the conditions 
in which the New Deal became possible.
27, 28
 
 In the early post war period, libertarians were scattered, unorganized, and 
were speaking about the dangers of collectivism during a time when Americans 
were optimistic and confident that the New Deal had been instrumental in raising 
the living standard of destitute citizens during the hardest of times.  The early 
libertarians were isolationists, despite the Allied victory in World War II and the 
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war’s role in salvaging the economy.  As a consensus was emerging around the 
New Deal and Roosevelt’s drive to war was ensuing, the American political and 
ideological spectrum was restructured.  Opponents of the war who were 
previously on the left found themselves castigated as reactionaries and anti-
Semites.
29, 30
  Isolationist libertarians, such as Mencken, Nock, and Nock’s 
protégé, Frank Chodorov, had been diminished in their access to getting their 
ideas out because of their opposition to the war effort.  Mencken had withdrawn 
from political commentary and Nock and Mencken were no longer writing for the 
American Mercury after the paper lost its libertarian and isolationist editor in 
1939.
31
  Chodorov was terminated as director of the Henry George School in New 
York for maintaining anti-war views.  Anti-war progressives found political allies 
among conservative, isolationist Mid-Western laissez-faire Republicans, e.g. 
Robert Taft of Ohio and Howard Buffet of Nebraska (father of billionaire, Warren 
Buffett).  Many who were not before would come to consider themselves 
conservative after being chastised as such for so long.  The American Communist 
Party’s support of the war, except for the period of the Stalin-Hitler Pact, and their 
charges against isolationists (both conservative and non-conservative) as 
“conscious fascists” helped stoke a resentment which would later help push many 
who were leaning toward the left, like John Chamberlain and Frank Meyer, 
toward the anti-communists right.
32
  This period had ushered in US intervention 
in a bloody foreign war, an economy with more domestic regulation, a stronger 
American state, and millions of military draftees, resulting in the alienation of 
those who considered themselves isolationists and classical liberals and who 
gradually came to identify with the political right.
33
  This was a bleak time for the 
libertarians, and for many in this tradition, the old New Deal left was enjoying a 
sort of heyday.  
  
PLANNING AS CATALYST FOR “ABSOLUTISM AND DICTATORSHIP” 
 
This bleak political circumstance would gradually change, however.  By 
the early 1940s, laissez-faire individualism provided a framework to identify the 
causes of the war and the emergence of fascist and totalitarian regimes.  These 
claims were grandly theoretical and inadequately based on empirical scholarship.  
Rather, the axiom, collectivism equals tyranny, was held as an a priori truth used 
to interpret all social and political realities where there was state planning and 
intervention of virtually any kind.  Friedrich von Hayek’s Road to Serfdom, 
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published in 1944, was unexpectedly popular in its day and was influential to 
many who would become important figures in the American conservative 
movement.  Along with von Mises’ less popular Bureaucracy, Road to Serfdom 
was a major inspiration for future NR columnist Russell Kirk.
34
  While Kirk’s 
views were solidly isolationist and laissez-faire through World War II, like 
Buckley, he would later become a leader of the intellectual New Right and 
disavow many basic libertarian principles.  Hayek’s book was also was 
instrumental in converting many former socialists to individualism/ capitalism.  
Among them were John Chamberlain, a leading leftist writer in the 1930s, and 
Frank Meyer, who became one of the many ex-communists that became virulent 
proponents of anti-communism.
35, 36
  Both would become central figures at NR.  
While Chodorov, Rothbard, and other staunch laissez-faire individualists felt that 
Hayek’s book was reformist and did not go far enough, Reader’s Digest had 
condensed the book for its readership and the Hearst Papers published it as a 
serial.
37, 38
   
The American release of Hayek’s book was a monumental event for a 
modest resurgence of classical liberalism in the there.  It sparked both curiosity 
and outrage among its readers.  The book became regular assigned reading on 
American college campuses and, in von Mises’ words, “within a few weeks the 
small book became a best seller and was translated into all civilized languages.”
39
  
The book raised more than a few eyebrows, and its popularity in America shocked 
Hayek himself.  Nash’s discussion of the contradictory though intense reaction is 
informative.  He speculates that the harsh and widespread criticism of the book 
from disparate and numerous sources in the US could have been caused in part by 
the fact that the idea of a “new kind of rationally constructed society” had still 
seemed novel for many Americans, and to criticize the New Deal project was to 
criticize something nearly sacred.
40
  On the other hand, he offers that its positive 
resonation with many Americans could possibly be credited to the New Deal 
consensus never fully solidifying.
41
  Either way, to von Hayek, his cohorts, and 
his followers, this rationally constructed society was an illusion.  It was not the 
aim of central planning or socialism which he took issue with, but the means by 
which its aims were sought out.  Hayek wrote that since “it may…seem unfair to 
use the term ‘socialism’ to describe its methods rather than its aims…it is 
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probably preferable to describe the methods which can be used for a great variety 
of ends as collectivism and to regard socialism as a species of that genus.”
42
  
Therefore, “collectivism” describes market interventions and planning in general.  
For Hayek, collectivism represented nothing less than the suppression of freedom.  
The nuances and differing objectives between the different varieties were not 
important:  
The various kinds of collectivism, communism, fascism, 
etc., differ among themselves in the nature of the goal 
toward which they want to direct the efforts of society.  But 
they all differ from [classical] liberalism and individualism 
in wanting to organize the whole of society and all its 
resources for this unitary end and in refusing to recognize 
autonomous spheres in which the ends of the individuals 
are supreme.  In short, they are totalitarian in the true sense 
of this new word which we have adopted to describe the 
unexpected but nevertheless inseparable manifestations of 
what in theory we call collectivism.
43
 
Hayek’s book and its dramatic reception put some wind in the sails of the 
Old Right, whose ideas at that time were less than popular.  The laissez-faire, Old 
Right tended to regard the workings of the market and Adam Smith’s concept of 
the invisible hand as sacrosanct principles with applications not just within the 
realm of economics but in society as well.  A year after Road to Serfdom, von 
Hayek would elaborate the belief that economic principles are themselves rooted 
in nature, and are applicable beyond the economic realm.  He argued with regard 
to the price system that it was the “economic calculus” which coordinates the 
“separate actions of different people in the same way as subjective values help the 
individual to co-ordinate the parts of his plan.”
44
  In order for its real function to 
be understood, the price system must be regarded as a means of information 
transmission.
45
  As a product of knowledge and its processes often operating 
beyond the level of consciousness, his argument situates the price mechanism 
within human nature itself.
46
  Remarkably reminiscent of George Herbert Mead’s 
concept of self-imposed social control of the individual through taking the role of 
the other, von Hayek argued that 
                                          
42 F. A. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, (Chicago, IL:  The University of Chicago Press, 1969), 
p. 33. 
43 Hayek, ibid., p. 56 (my italics). 
44 F. A. von Hayek, ‘The Use of Knowledge in Society’, The Virtual School, ¶20 reprinted from 
the American Economic Review, 35(4) (1945), pp. 519-30, retrieved November 12, 2008 
(http://www.virtualschool.edu/mon/Economics/HayekUseOfKnowledge.html). 
45 Hayek, ibid. 
46 Hayek, ibid. 
the problem is precisely how to extend the span of our 
utilization of resources beyond the span of the control of 
any one mind; and therefore, how to dispense with the need 
of conscious control, and how to provide inducements 
which will make the individuals do the desirable things 
without anyone having to tell them what to do.
47
 
Though von Mises had been Chief Economic Advisor to the Austrian 
Government in the 1920s and his business cycle theory had been adopted by 
many of the younger English economists in the early 1930s to explain the 
American Great Depression, his work had become largely forgotten by the late 
1930s amidst the Keynesian revolution.
48, 49
  He did not make the splash that 
Hayek had, but nonetheless, for the Old Right, his great efforts were part of a 
small upsurge in libertarian thought.  His Omnipotent Government was published 
in 1944 (along with his book, Bureaucracy), and was being read at Columbia 
University at that time as a counter-position to Franz Neumann’s Behemoth.
50
  
National Socialism, argued von Mises, was a by-product and modification of 
central planning and socialism.
51
  Conversely, Neumann held that adequate legal 
restrictions were not enacted by the German state and therefore the growth of 
monopolies went on unfettered.
52
  Neumann concluded that National Socialism 
was thus a totalitarian variant of monopoly capitalism.
53
  Contrary to Neumann 
and consistent with Hayek’s prognosis, von Mises wrote that “every step which 




Mises’ nearly 1000 page tome, Human Action, was published in 1949 and 
was received by many in the movement as a sort of “capitalist manifesto.”
55
  
While Karl Polanyi’s widely read, The Great Transformation argued that the 
advent of machines and mechanized production gave rise to the ideology of the 
self-regulating market, in Human Action von Mises saw the process as the 
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reverse.
56
  He argued that the technological achievements leading to the industrial 
revolution had been the consequence of the innovations and efforts of the laissez-
faire economic theorists.
57
  The Marxian identification of laissez-faire principals 
as part of the “ideological superstructure” of the capitalist mode of production and 
its assumption that the improvement of the engines of production were simply 
contemporaneous with the doctrine of the free-market were viewed by von Mises 
as inaccurate.
58
  Also in his analysis, he credited the “laissez-faire methods of the 
past” with the advent of the shorter workday and the higher standard of living of 
US workers compared to those of other societies, methods which refrained from 
interfering with capitalism’s “evolution.”
59
  Government and reformers were not 
identified as the historical thrust for these social transformations, and like Hayek, 
he attached the blame for the emergence of “aggressive nationalism” on 
collectivism and central planning.
60
  Central planning can only result from the 
despotic consolidation of power and thus promotes the emergence of conflicts 
“for which no peaceful solution can be found,” since such peaceful resolutions are 
only possible through a world government constituted by absolute free trade and 
free-markets.
61
  The utopianism of von Mises’ framework is especially evident in 
his apologia for imperialism and his description of social conditions in a society 
where capitalism is left unfettered.  He argued that, “It is false to blame the 
European powers for the poverty of the masses in their colonial empires.  In 
investing capital, the foreign rulers did all they could for an improvement in 
material well-being.”
62
  Rather, he explains, it is the fault of the colonized who 
are not willing to leave traditional beliefs behind and accept the capitalism which 
is being offered to them.  To be fair, von Mises assumed that these societies 
would struggle for their independence, but his assumption that European 
colonizers were engaging in nation building efforts is at best naïve.
63
  In 
envisioning a society with “unhampered capitalism,” he foresees that there would 
no longer be a question of poverty as it exists in “backwards” nations; such a 
capitalist utopia would create a society in which “there are no able-bodied 
paupers.”
64
  Throughout Human Action, von Mises discounts what he viewed as 
myth, e.g. Marxism, metaphysical superstition, and social scientific 
methodologies which claim to result in complete understanding.  While any 
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methodological claim of ultimate knowledge is immediately false, Von Mises’ 
view of unhampered capitalism as a “logically incontestable procedure” presents 
itself as pure metaphysics.
65
 
  The pressures of war further isolated and split libertarian scholars, not 
just in terms of their views towards government involvement in foreign wars but 
also in terms of their proximity to each other.  The war had left classical 
liberalism in a feeble and disorganized state.  There was a need to regroup and 
organize a political strategy.  By 1945, von Hayek would begin to advocate for 
and plan the formation of an international organization to meet annually to 
provide a forum for the exchange of ideas for like-minded libertarian scholars.  
The effort would prove to be fruitful, but was predicated on contradictory 
principles.  While heavy on rhetoric which warned of the evils of collectivism/ 
central planning, nuances of the program continued to move away from an 
unadulterated laissez-faire, free-market position.  The Acton-Tocqueville Society 
was the name proposed by von Hayek, but after objections by von Mises during 
the group’s first meeting, they took the name of the spa where the meeting took 
place, Mont Pelerin.
66
  Hayek, in an August 1945 memorandum, explained his 
partiality to Lord Acton and Alexis de Tocqueville’s political philosophies, for 
which he identifies a “kinship” with the “ideas of Edmund Burke.”
67
  In Burke, 
we find an early modern, and reluctant, expression of the possibility for 
reconciliation between classical conservative and classical liberal ideals in 
response to the brutality of the French Revolution, i.e. an acknowledged 
legitimacy of claims to individual freedom and liberty but also deference and 
respect toward the old, hierarchical, order.
68
  So it was with trepidation that Burke 
wrote of the victors of the French Revolution, “… They may do what they please:  
We ought to see what it will please them to do before we risque [sic] 
congratulations.”
69
  Hayek was careful to indicate that he did not want to apply 
Burke’s philosophy as a whole, but rather his “wisdom purged of its 
execrescenses [sic] and developed in the light of the experience of the last 
century.”
70
  Just which aspects he intended to retain and which to discard as 
excrescences is not totally clear, but Hayek’s intention of using political 
philosophers with an intellectual heritage in the thought of Burke for the 
namesake of his new organization is not insignificant.  While the Acton-
Tocqueville Society name was disposed of, its choice by von Hayek, especially 
that of Acton is revealing.  He saw in this work the elevation of “Burkean 
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philosophy to the highest point it has yet reached.”
71
  While contradictory, this 
choice was a gesture of readiness to accept “legitimate” government authority and 
perhaps a socio-political formation based on traditional or even religious 
conviction.  We find in the work of Acton the predominance of the “collective 
will” or “free will of the collective people” over “every man’s free will.”
72
  In 
God and in His will, Acton identified a “will superior to the collective will of 
man,” which was made known by the ancients.
73
  Ultimately, he resolved that 
Christ’s words during his last visit to the temple three days prior to his crucifixion 
– “Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that 
are God’s,” – were a symbolic “repudiation of absolutism” and an “inauguration 
of freedom.”
74
  Here, a christening of sorts of civil governance i.e. a legitimate 
collective will over individuals, is recognized as the source of its legitimacy.  This 
is not to cast Acton as a conservative (in the classical sense), but rather to 
highlight elements of what would become the ideology of neoliberalism which 
disclose its inner contradictions.  Rothbard’s articulation of this contradiction is 
informative.
75
  Remembering a debate he had while in graduate school with leftist 
friends, Rothbard acknowledged a valid challenge made to his laissez-faire 
position which pushed him toward the opposite philosophic pole from von Hayek: 
They: What is the legitimate basis for your laissez-faire 
government, for this political entity confined solely to 
defending person and property? 
[Rothbard]:  Well, the people get together and decide to 
establish such a government. 
They:  But if “the people” can do that, why can’t they do 
exactly the same thing and get together to choose a 
government that will build steel plants, dams, etc.? 
I [Rothbard] realized in a flash that their logic was 
impeccable, that laissez-faire was logically untenable, and 




In calling for the formation of his proposed organization, von Hayek 
exhibited a calamitous and urgent tone.  Hayek argued that civilization was in 
danger and that there was an urgent need for a common effort to reconsider  
our moral and political values and to sort out those which 
must in all circumstances be preserved and never sacrificed 
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or endangered for some other ‘advances’, and a deliberate 
effort to make people aware of the values which they take 
for granted as the air they breathe and which may yet be 




In terms of organizational structure, von Hayek had in mind the carrying out of 
the task of providing “channels and facilities of communication, of bringing 
together the people whose common outlook and interests make fruitful 
collaboration possible.”
78
  These same points were highlighted at an October 1946 
talk von Hayek gave at Stanford University.  He warned of the “serious dangers 
on the path on which we are moving,” that if nothing was done the “gradual 
advance of totalitarian control” would not be prevented.
79
  Democratic countries 
were in some ways in more jeopardy than the “ex-belligerent countries” because 
the libertarian intellectuals from the formerly totalitarian societies understood the 
mechanism by which totalitarian regimentation emerged.
80
  Americans, he argued, 
felt falsely secure from the “horrors of totalitarian government,” and that the 
commonly held opinion was the same in Europe prior to the rise of fascism.
81
  For 
von Hayek, a state of opinion which reflected a hopefulness that the government 
had an important role to play in ensuring a minimal standard of living was 
evoking government control for a desirable outcome but was “bound to lead us 
into a system where the government controls everything.”
82
  In an effort to vilify 
the New Deal and government planning during the same speech, he quoted 
Rexford Tugwell and generalized that what “American ‘planners’ have in store 
for you” is Soviet-style totalitarianism.
83
  But as the “American would-be-
dictators” were not taken seriously as a threat, he advocated for a collaborative, 
international effort including intellectuals from those countries where momentum 
toward totalitarianism was greater and more advanced.
84
  Thus he announced his 
intention of forming an organization “half-way between a scholarly association 
and a political society” with its “most urgent task” of bringing together 
intellectuals who have taken on the common undertaking of “elaborating a 
workable philosophy for a free society.”
85
   
 
“THE REASSERTING OF VALID IDEAS” 
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From April 1-April 10, 1947, a group of classical liberal intellectuals, 
revolving around von Hayek and including von Mises and Milton Friedman, 
convened in the Swiss Alps to exchange ideas and attempt to collectively 
strengthen the position of their movement.
86, 87, 88
  This event and the resultant 
organization which arose was effectively the first think tank committed to 
researching and advocating, through the production and deployment of ideas, 
libertarian principles.  The Mont Pelerin Society had convened its first meeting.  
On the ropes and weak compared to Keynesian state-based interventionist 
economics, the laissez-fairists met in an atmosphere of crisis and gloom.  In the 
two years leading up to that first meeting, von Hayek spelled out early the 
measures which needed to be taken for him and his colleagues to fulfill their 
mission.  Although he claimed the group would refrain from propagandizing or 
affiliating itself with any particular party, he said of the Mont Pelerin Society, 
“It’s aim must remain directed towards creating a state of public opinion in which 
the desirable will be possible rather than at finding out what is possible in the 
existing state of opinion.”
89
  He stated that the task of the organization could well 
be considered “educational,” since the effort would be “to cultivate and to spread 
beliefs which would have to achieve wide support if the sort of world most people 
want is to become a possibility.”
90
  After all, this is how the statists and central 
planners, in his view, had successfully created the prevailing state of affairs 
during that time, i.e. how the “new philosophy of government… [had] penetrated 
every-day thinking.”
91
  Thus, when the “intellectual struggle to develop” free-
market ideas comes to a halt, the battle has been lost; “a stationary creed is a 
dying creed.”
92
  The economists, philosophers, historians, and other figures that 
had joined von Hayek in the Swiss Alps agreed on the following statement of 
aims: 
The central values of civilization are in danger.   Over large 
stretches of the earth’s surface the essential conditions of 
human dignity and freedom have already disappeared.  In 
others they are under constant menace from the 
development of current tendencies of policy.  The position 
of the individual and the voluntary group are progressively 
undermined by extensions of arbitrary power.  Even that 
most precious possession of Western Man, freedom of 
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thought and expression, is threatened by the spread of 
creeds which, claiming the privilege of tolerance when in 
the position of a minority, seek only to establish a position 
of power in which they can suppress and obliterate all 
views but their own. 
 
The group holds that these developments have been 
fostered by the growth of a view of history which denies all 
absolute moral standards and by the growth of theories 
which question the desirability of the rule of law.  It holds 
further that they have been fostered by a decline of belief in 
private property and the competitive market; for without 
the diffused power and initiative associated with these 
institutions it is difficult to imagine a society in which 
freedom may be effectively preserved.
93
 
 Before listing the matters the Mont Pelerin Society would chiefly address, 
the statement read that an “essentially ideological movement” is threatening 
civilization and it “must be met by intellectual argument and the reassertion of 
valid ideals.”
94
  In other words, an ideological counter offensive was necessary.  
In a statement made during the conference, von Hayek indicted the teaching and 
interpretation of history during the previous two generations with the crime of 
spreading “essentially anti-[classical] liberal conceptions of human affairs.”
95
  He 
argued that this teaching of history had incorrectly attributed social change with 
historical advancement even when the transformations taking place were 
impeding of liberty.
96
  Further, the historical approach denied all moral standards 
by way of historical relativism, emphasized social movements instead of 
individual achievement in explaining historical transformation, and highlighted 
historical necessity rather than the power of ideas in shaping the future.
97
  In 
short, a metaphysical conception of economic rationality was proposed over and 
against historical and materialist reasoning.  The crisis faced by the libertarians 
was perceived as an ideological one, and the model for engagement provided by 
the Mont Pelerin Society would come to influence others who would go on to 
create similar organizations, including the conservative, pro-capital think tanks 
which would come to heavily influence policy decisions in the US around various 
issues, including health care, education, and welfare.  The laissez-faire rhetoric of 
the libertarians would later prove to be effective in attacking and dismantling the 
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social, philosophical, and economic bases on which the welfare states of the 
United Kingdom and especially the US had been constructed. 
Many important figures would follow von Hayek’s prescriptions and turn 
to utopian intellectualism and the power of ideas instead of politics.
98
  At von 
Hayek’s advice, Leonard E. Read founded the Foundation for Economic 
Excellence (FEE) in 1946.  The FEE would serve as a central forum around which 
libertarians would be attracted and brought into the movement.
99
  It was Cornell 
economist, F.A. Harper, who had led the first group of libertarian economists at 
the FEE.
100
  Read had assured Harper that the foundation would serve as a 
research institute or think tank for advanced libertarian scholarship.
101
  Harper 
was particularly open to mentoring newcomers to the libertarian movement and to 
the FEE.  The foundation offered to those on its mailing list (28,712 people by the 
summer of 1952 and roughly 50,000 by the late 1950s and beyond) a growing 
assortment of libertarian literature.
102
  Its staff included von Mises, and Read was 
in regular correspondence with and advised by von Hayek, Ayn Rand, and other 
advocates of laissez-faire, classical liberal thought who were growing in 
prominence.  The FEE provided libertarians with a forum and sanctuary during a 
low point for laissez-faire ideas.  Highlighting the absolutism in the philosophical 
framework of free-market ideology, Read would write what would become an 
iconic essay, which would later be used by Milton Friedman in his television 
show and Book, Free to Choose.  In this 1958 pamphlet, Read gives us an 
example of true laissez-faire piety – a Genesis narrative of a commodity, the 
pencil.  He writes that the reader should “have faith that free men and women will 
respond to the Invisible Hand.  This faith will be confirmed.  I, Pencil, seemingly 
simple though I am, offer the miracle of my creation as testimony that this is a 
practical faith, as practical as the sun, the rain, a cedar tree, the good earth.”
103
  
Interestingly, at the time he wrote his pamphlet about the pencil, he would have 
conceded some of his more militant laissez-faire tenets.  In 1954, he would write 
a booklet which created a stir at the FEE among the more radical free-marketers 
and which to many of the foundation’s members put him back in the “pro-
government camp” and out of the camp of the anarcho-capitalists.
104
  The 
organization’s strict libertarian orientation would decline further as the fusionist 
line of the emerging New Right (which selectively and contradictorily combined 
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laissez-faire tenets with militarist and social conservative principles) was gaining 
prominence. 
Harold Luhnow, nephew of William Volker, succeeded his uncle as head 
of his wholesale company and the William Volker Fund in 1944.
105, 106
  He too 
would take von Hayek’s advice, orienting the Volker Fund in the direction of 
supporting and promoting laissez-faire scholarship after his uncle’s death in 1947.  
In addition to this, the Volker Fund would help some of the more prolific but 
marginalized libertarian scholars to find posts at American universities.
107, 108, 109
  
Mises was offered a visiting professorship post at New York University’s 
business school, and Luhnow arranged for Hayek a professorship at the 
Committee on Social Thought at the University of Chicago.
110
  The activities of 
the Volker Fund contributed to the formation and activities of institutions with 
corresponding aims, including the Intercollegiate Society of Individualists (ISI), 
which was founded by Chodorov and later renamed the Intercollegiate Studies 
Institute, and the FEE.
111, 112
  Chodorov never wavered from his Nockian 
individualism, but his successor at the ISI had brought the organization into 
traditionalist conservative territory (hence the name change).
113
  Old Right groups 
were increasing the distance between themselves and pure libertarian principles, 
what Rothbard and others began to call “anarcho-capitalism.”
114
  In the case of the 
FEE’s retreat from its strict laissez-faire individualist position, Harper would 
resign and join the staff of the Volker Fund.   
Sir Antony Fisher of England read the condensed version of Hayek’s book 
in Reader’s Digest and was deeply influenced as well.
115
  Fisher was a pilot 
during World War II, and after the war he felt that the fight against totalitarianism 
had yet to be finished.  Hayek’s view that totalitarianism was merely a step 
further from the embrace of socialist ideas and reforms resonated with Fisher.  In 
1945, he sought out von Hayek at the London School of Economics where he was 
teaching at the time, and asked his advice about what he could do.  Fisher’s 
daughter recounts that “Hayek said to him, ‘Don’t go in to politics.  You have to 
alter public opinion.  It’ll take a long time.  You do it through the intellectuals, the 
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second-hand dealers in ideas.’”
116
  In 1952, Fisher would visit Harper at the FEE 
in United States and, among other things, learn about the factory farming of 
chickens; he would later amass a fortune in the UK as the “British Frank 
Perdue.”
117
  The means and resources were acquired for Fisher to enter the 
struggle in the arena of ideas and opinion, and in 1955, he would found the 
Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) in London.  This would prove to be an 
important launch pad from which numerous ideas and other think-tanks would 
spring, including several institutes in the US, making Fisher a full-time “think-
tank entrepreneur.”
118
  This undertaking would prove to be successful, so much so 
that a 2006 BBC documentary on the political and ideological roots of 
Thatcherism begins with the narration, “It all began with chickens, lots of 
chickens.”
119
  In a 1985 video, Fisher identifies the source of Britain’s economic 
woes after World War II as not the cost of two major wars and the loss of a 
productive empire, as was commonly argued; rather, the “major cause of Britain’s 
economic decline… was the famous welfare state.”
120
 
Following von Hayek’s counsel to produce ideas instead of enter politics, 
the IEA and its allied planning organizations set out to make the case for a “sound 
economy amongst intellectuals, that is teachers, students, and the media, 
[otherwise] there would be little hope of anyone’s achieving anything as a 
politician” (Atlas Economic Research Foundation 1985).
121
  In the same video, 
Fisher outlined the strategy of the IEA and other organizations modeled on its 
structure.  The strategy began with the production of publications on an 
assortment of economic issues – rent control, nationalization of industry, 
agricultural subsidies, tariffs, inflation, social security, and welfare among others.  
The model for the production of the publications was as follows:  they were 
purposefully developed 
regardless of the political feasibility.  [A] publication is 
then promoted in universities, in the press, through 
seminars, on radio and television until its concepts are well 
dispersed.  Its influence can be immediate among students 
who are reading free-market economics for the first time.  
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Fisher goes on to boast that at that time, there were 19 institutes in 12 countries 
modeled on the IEA, including the Pacific Institute in San Francisco, California, 
the Frasier Institute in British Columbia, Canada, and the Manhattan Institute in 
New York City.
123
  Thatcher would write a letter to Fisher giving the IEA credit 
for “creating the climate of opinion which made our victory possible,” and Ralph 
Harris, the IEA’s general director, was given a seat in the House of Lords as a 
reward.
124
  Fisher recalls von Hayek encouraging him to “make those policies 
politically possible which otherwise to practical people appear to be politically 
impossible.  And we can only do this by first establishing the case among the 
intellectuals.”
125
   
 
MAKING “COMMON CAUSE” WITH CONSERVATIVES 
 
How does one make classical liberal, free-market economic ideology 
appear feasible to practical people?  In addition to attacking rival ideas through a 
substantial ideological effort, von Hayek proposed a more inclusive stature from 
within the free-market movement and stressed the necessity to cooperate with 
scholars who espouse views which may be less rigorous than those of “good 
liberals in the old sense” or who are even conservative in the classical sense.
126
  
Illustrative in this respect is a comment in von Hayek’s introduction to The Road 
to Serfdom, and its prescience in acknowledging the necessity for compromise 
with traditionalist conservatives to make libertarian ideas and proposals more 
viable.  Though he highlighted the lack of harmony between these two political 
groupings, von Hayek openly noted that  
in the struggle against the believers in the all-powerful state 
the true [classical] liberal must sometimes make common 
cause with the conservative, and in some circumstances, as 
in contemporary Britain, he has hardly any other way of 
actively working for his ideals.  But true [classical] 
liberalism is still distinct from conservativism [sic], and 
there is danger in the two being confused.
127
   
While the book prompted some libertarian scholars to criticize that it was 
conciliatory and not laissez-faire enough, it was perhaps this feature of the book 
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that ultimately made it so popularly appealing and effective.  Chodorov 
complained that he was let down, and even von Mises, von Hayek’s mentor, 
implicitly criticized the contradictory position of Road to Serfdom.  He did not 
agree with von Hayek’s conceptual acceptance of the state playing a limited role 
in economic planning.  Mises commented that planning by the state for 
competition and the planning of each person or household to determine its own 
fate should remain a significant distinction.
128, 129
  He staunchly asserted that in 
such proposals, advocates of even limited planning offer the following, “Let us 
raise wage rates, let us lower profits, let us curtail the salaries of executives.”
130, 
131
  However, provocatively, he asserted that the “us ultimately refers to the 
police.”
132, 133
  Those who propose such projects, complains von Mises, naively 
claim that they are “planning for freedom.”
134, 135
  Despite his misgivings, von 
Mises was more enthusiastic about the book’s virtues, impact, and success than 
what he saw as logical inconsistencies.  In correspondence to a colleague, he 
explained, “The positive [statist] program developed by Hayek matters little when 
compared with these virtues of his book.  However, it is a very comforting fact 
that your friends were shrewd enough to see the contradictions in this 
program.”
136
  Rothbard lamented that von Hayek’s work attracted more scholarly 
attention than did von Mises.
137
  He argued that unlike von Mises, “Hayek was 
unable to recognize people’s understanding of the significance of laissez-faire 
economics in terms of the flourishing and survival of human society or of 
rejecting forcible interferences of the free market system.”
138
  Further, he 
contended that von Hayek’s thought was muddled, inconsistent, and 
contradictory, and that the style of Road to Serfdom was brutally Germanic and 
not as readable as von Mises’ work.  These criticisms aside, both von Mises and 
Rothbard were in awe of von Hayek’s success. 
 As he had expressed in Road to Serfdom, there was a willingness of von 
Hayek to collaborate with those who were believers in traditional social hierarchy 
and opponents of individual liberty.  Thinkers like Mencken, Nock, Chodorov, 
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and Rothbard were not only opposed to state power, but were in opposition to any 
type of political or legislative efforts based on traditional authority, morality, or 
religion.  Laissez-faire intellectuals like Mencken and Ayn Rand were 
unapologetic atheists.
139, 140
  In a 1945 book review of George Bernard Shaw’s 
Everybody’s Political What’s What, Nock finds a positive note in Shaw’s work, 
one he wishes was evident in the work of alleged anti-statist writers such as von 
Hayek.  He writes that Shaw “does not make the slightest concession to anybody. 
…It is either “eighteen-carat collectivist statism, by God, or nothing.”
141
  Nock 
continued, 
One wishes our anti-Statist writers had that much intrepid 
faith in their principles and as clear knowledge of what 
their principles are. … What completely vitiates Mr. 
Hayek's work, Mr. Eric Johnston's, and a whole shoal of 
others, is that they concede a small and strictly limited 
measure of State intervention — a sort of five-percent 
Statism. Apparently, like Mr. Shaw, these writers never 
heard of the Law of Parsimony, and have no idea of what it 
can do. If they had even considered the history of this 
country's twenty-five years' experience under the Income 
Tax Amendment, they would begin to see the reason why 
their notion is as absurd as the notion of a small and strictly 
limited implantation of tuberculosis, syphilis, or cancer. 
There is no such shuffling nonsense about Mr. Shaw's 




So despite the warnings and unease of many of his free-market, laissez-
faire contemporaries, von Hayek began a direction of advocacy and coordination 
around the formation of the Mont Pelerin Society which revealed an urgent 
readiness to make concessions.  For von Hayek, libertarian intellectuals who 
followed Shaw’s example of unwavering allegiance to their doctrine need not 
apply.  In his address to the first Mont Pelerin Society conference, von Hayek told 
the participants that while such staunch classical liberals were admirable in their 
convictions, they were not of much use for the group’s purposes.
143
  He went on 
to tell those in attendance, “What we need are people who have faced the 
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arguments from the other side, who have struggled with them and fought 
themselves through to a position from which they can both critically meet the 
objection against it and justify their views.”
144
  In the search for a representative 
and universal statement of “true liberal principles,” von Hayek explained that he 
had considered Mill’s On Liberty, but was made to hesitate because of Mill’s and 
other nineteenth century classical liberals’ hostility toward religion.
145
  Hayek saw 
this hostility as counterproductive in that it had driven many “true friends of 
liberty” from libertarianism.
146
  Approaching the theoretical territory of traditional 
Tory conservatism, he attributed this hostility by laissez-faire scholars towards 
religion to an “aggressive rationalism” which rejected all values whose utility 
could not “be demonstrated by individual reason” and which relied on science to 
determine “what is” and “what ought to be.”
147
  Hayek explained that the 
influence of this rationalism owes itself to Hegelianism and positivism.
148
  This 
tendency, he continued, had created an “intellectual hubris” which is opposed to 
“the essence of true liberalism …which treats with respect those spontaneous 
social forces through which the individual creates things greater than he 
knows.”
149
  This aggressive rationalism, von Hayek continued, created the gulf 
separating religious people from the libertarian movement, and unless the breach 
“can be healed there is no hope for a revival of liberal forces.”
150
  While Rothbard 
and von Mises expressed unease at such assertions, von Hayek moved forward 
with their ultimate approval since libertarian principles would be advanced, even 
though it was through a neo-Burkean laissez-faire theoretical framework.  As the 
Old Right would fade into the late 1950s and the New Right came in to its own, 
libertarian intellectuals from Chodorov to von Hayek would find themselves in 
intellectual confrontations with many of the features and notables of the budding 
fusionist conservative current.   
The conciliatory posture exhibited by von Hayek was predictive of a more 
general intellectual disposition which was gradually emerging.  By the time 
Leonard Read of the FEE had written his liturgical passages about the pencil, 
free-market, and good earth, he had already backpedaled from the laissez-faire 
zeal of the FEE’s borderline free-market anarchism.  Saintly proclamations can 
present themselves as a sort of intellectual reaction-formation to developed 
tendencies contrary to what is being professed.  By the time Read wrote these 
words, many in the FEE circle had come to see him as a sort of government-
supporting “sellout,” again signaling an emerging free-market ideology which 
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was more surface than substantive.  Hayek’s concerns over an alliance with 
traditionalist conservatism, given its “paternalistic, nationalistic, and power-
adoring tendencies,” and his lamentations that this form of conservatism is often 
closer to socialism, would ultimately bear out in what came to be called fusionism 
and later in neoconservatism.
151
  Buckley, Rusher, Kirk, Meyer, and others at NR 
regarded as necessary a fusion between the libertarian’s advocacy for liberty, 
individualism, and a small state on the one hand, and the new conservative 
promotion of order, championing the global anti-communist crusade, and support 
for the formation of a massive military industrial complex on the other.   
The affect of laissez-faire thought on the burgeoning neoconservative 
political formation was also significant.  The so called godfather of 
neoconservatism, Irving Kristol, had described that initially the early 
neoconservatives (himself, Daniel Bell, Nathan Glazer, et al.) had developed a 
skepticism “of government programs that ignored history and experience in favor 
of then-fashionable left-wing ideas spawned by the academy.”
152
  Later, While 
Kristol was not a true believer in the branch of neo-laissez-faire doctrine which 
emerged in the 1970s, supply-side economics, he had “quickly saw its political 
possibilities” when first exposed to it at the American Enterprise Institute.
153
  In 
Road to Serfdom, Hayek conceded that in order for the advocates of libertarianism 
to make gains, a political alliance with traditionalist conservatism is sometimes 
necessary.  But the changes which would take place in the approaching 
circumstances would eventually bring about much dissatisfaction and a sort of 
purging of libertarians and other discomforting “extremists.”
154
  Hindsight is 
always 20/20.  In 1960, von Hayek would write a postscript in his Constitution of 
Liberty titled “Why I am Not a Conservative,” where he warned of the “danger” 
of conditions which bring “defenders of liberty” and conservatives together.
155
  
After a careful explication of how libertarianism and conservatism differ, he 
specifically cited the latter’s embracing of authority and coercion as well as its 
reluctance for change as weaknesses which tend “to harm any cause it allies itself 
with.”
156
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The anti-state and individualist philosophy of the Old Right and its politics 
were radical and reproached the traditional authority of inherited rank, throne, and 
altar.  Its adherents included anti-war isolationists, atheists, and self-proclaimed 
anarchists.  Its writing could be persuasive, engaging, and at times witty.  Its 
slogans and spirit had carried through to and been taken over by the contemporary 
conservative movement. This includes today’s antigovernment populist 
conservatives, recently so visible in the coverage and commentary around the Tea 
Party Movement, in the latest efforts toward health care reform in the US, and in 
the grass roots political successes in recent elections.  The occurrence of 
fusionism in the 1950s would prove to be important for the later political success 
of the conservative movement, e.g. the elevation of Barry Goldwater to the status 
of a grassroots and populist conservative icon and the subsequent capturing of the 
Republican Party by the right in the 1960s.  Incorporating free-market doctrine 
with their chiefly behavioral analysis of welfare and poverty and critique of the 
New Left, the neoconservatives further transformed the political right to make it 
“more acceptable to a majority of American voters” and therefore contributed to 
moving the political culture rightward.
157
  This helped pave the way for the 
presidential victory of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the implementation of the 
Reagan tax and spending cuts in 1981.  Though the language of the laissez-faire 
individualists was appropriated by the New Right and later, though in a different 
variation, by the neoconservatives, it was maintained for ideological purposes 
only, and the economism cum moralism of the contemporary antigovernment 
conservatives is in significant measure an intellectual and political inheritance 
from both the fusionists and neoconservatives.  Economic conservative and Texas 
Congressman, Ron Paul has criticized today’s conservative movement on similar 
grounds.  One occasion was on the floor of the House of Representatives in July 
2003.  The highlights of that event can be widely seen on the World Wide Web in 
a video which had gone viral in that same year.
158
  While laissez-faire 
individualism in its pure form was abandoned and isolationist and atheistic 
“extremist” libertarians were, in effect, expelled from the conservative movement, 
a libertarian façade has been maintained in the form of neoliberalism.  The 
outcome was remarkably ideological, fixing how we think about poverty, 
inequality, and social policy in terms divorced from historical and political 
processes.  The concrete consequences of this process has been to reinforce quasi-
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aristocratic features of the American class structure but with language couched in 
the Enlightenment discourse of individual freedom and liberty. 
